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After taking care of Kirill Kaprizov to the tune of eight years and $136 million, the Minnesota Wild decided they weren't quite done with their offseason checklist. Instead of resting on their laurels, they worked quickly to lock down their starting goalie, Filip Gustavsson, with a five-year, $34 million deal. It's perhaps an acknowledgement that if their superstar scores 50 or even 60 goals, it just takes a little instability in net to thwart a team. Look at the 2023-34 New Jersey Devils. They had 112 points the previous season, but their revolving door of Vitek Vanecek, Nico Daws, Akira Schmid, Jake Allen, and Kaapo Kähkönen kept them in seventh place in their division. It didn't matter that they had Jack Hughes, Nico Hischier, and Jesper Bratt as part of a loaded roster. Looking at the Wild's steadfast defense, it's fair to say that Gustavsson's .914 save percentage -- sixth in the NHL last year -- isn't entirely reflective of his talent level. Still, he proved last year that he's capable of being a workhorse, starting-caliber goalie. Gustavsson started 58 games, turning in 40 "Quality Starts," which turned out to be the fifth-highest percentage in the league. That's a level of reliability the Wild simply couldn't walk from. Especially when you look at the alternatives. Minnesota drafted Jesper Wallstedt in 2021 to be the team's "Goalie of the Future." Turns out, the future isn't ready yet. The Wild were hoping to get Wallstedt games last season, but a combination of salary cap issues and his AHL struggles meant he only drew in for two starts. With Gustavsson set to become a free agent next summer, the Wild didn't have time to properly evaluate Wallstedt's readiness to take over starting next year. Normally, Wallstedt would be out of time. We've seen two of his highly-touted goalie prospect contemporaries -- Spencer Knight (2020 Draft) and Yaroslav Askarov (2021) -- get squeezed out of their team's future after their teams committed long-term to another goalie. Three days after the Florida Panthers drafted Knight, they signed Sergei Bobrovsky to eight years and $80 million. Askarov asked for a trade from the Nashville Predators after they locked in Juuse Saros to an eight-year extension. That may still be Wallstedt's fate. After all, the Panthers weren't forced to move on from Knight; they traded him as a major piece of the Seth Jones trade, helping them win a Stanley Cup last year. The Wild could choose to leverage Wallstedt in a similar fashion. However, the beauty of Gustavsson's extension is that Minnesota secured long-term stability in net while retaining options. Minnesota can simply have Gustavsson take the reins as the starting goaltender for the foreseeable future, and that's not a bad spot to be in. His career save percentage is .913, putting him even with former Wild players Marc-Andre Fleury and Devan Dubnyk through age 26. Once you adjust to the league average save percentage, as Stathead does with their Goals Allowed Percentage- which sets 100 as league average, Gustavsson fares very well. GA%- through Age-26, Since 2007-08, minimum 90 starts: Igor Shesterkin, 78 Tuukka Rask, 82 Juuse Saros, 90 Jaroslav Halák, 91 Andrei Vasilevskiy, 91 FILIP GUSTAVSSON, 91 Braden Holtby, 92 Jake Oettinger, 92 Logan Thompson, 93 Josh Gibson, 94 Even if you suspect his numbers make him look better than he is, he still is an above-average workhorse. The hockey equivalent of an innings-eating pitcher, if you will. Again, looking at the Devils, this time in 2024-25, that type of "innings-eater" was all they needed to get back into the playoff picture. The five-year term also comes in handy here. Gustavsson's extension will only take him through his age-32 season. Wild fans saw Devan Dubnyk start to fall off a cliff in his age-33 year, and Niklas Bäckström become unusable at age-34. If Gustavsson winds up taking a similar path on the aging curve, Minnesota should be getting out of this deal just in time. The term also means they don't have to hard-commit to Gustavsson at the expense of Wallstedt. Wallstedt's contract takes him through the summer of 2027, at which point he'll become a Restricted Free Agent. However, once that ends, the Wild still have him under team control through 2030, another three years after that. By comparison, that's only one year of team control less than they have with Gustavsson. When Wallstedt's contract is up, he'll most likely be in position to get a bridge deal. Barring injury, Gustavsson is a safe bet to take the majority of starts this season, and unless Wallstedt is markedly better, it's hard to see him forcing anything more than a 50/50 split in 2026-27. If the Wild can lock Wallstedt into an affordable rate through 2029, they're in a great spot beyond that. By 2029, Minnesota should have more than enough information on whether they want to have Wallstedt be The Guy going forward. If they do, they have two big advantages to avoid having Gustavsson squeeze Wallstedt out prematurely. The first is Gustavsson's trade clauses. He'll have a No-Move Clause through the summer of 2028, which turns into a 15-team no-trade clause afterward. That's a fair bit of flexibility to move on if the Wild feel the need to. The other advantage is the sheer affordability of Gustavsson's deal. That doesn't appear to be the case right away, but with the cap rising, we have to recalibrate what "$6.8 million" means. Gustavsson is set to be the 10th-highest-paid goalie next season, and his contract will only represent 6.5% of the salary cap -- roughly the equivalent of $5.8 million last year. If there's a time when Minnesota has to pay Wallstedt like a 1B goalie, they can do that without spending too much of their resources on the goalie position. The most important thing that the Wild could do was guarantee themselves a decent floor in net for the long term, and Gustavsson's contract does exactly that. That makes the extension worth it by itself. But the real value add for Minnesota was that they were able to do that without sacrificing their flexibility at the goalie position. They can either commit to Gustavsson long-term or establish a succession plan for Wallstedt, and they should be able to make that decision on their own terms. As important as the AAV and term are to evaluating contracts, it's hidden benefits like this that can turn a deal into a home run.

When the Minnesota Wild made their final training camp roster moves on Sunday, more notable than the players they cut were the players they didn’t. Rookies Danila Yurov, Liam Ohgren, and Zeev Buium all made the opening night roster. Hunter Haight will be on it as well, with Nico Sturm and Mats Zuccarello out due to injuries. Ohgren and Haight have the most professional experience and have a chance to be important depth pieces. Still, of the three forwards, I think that Yurov’s game is the best suited to be a consistent contributor this season due to his versatility. He may not start fast out of the gates and will probably be a healthy scratch at times. However, Yurov is a player whose style can complement a wide range of linemates, as he is dependable and predictable, which is what is needed to round out a deep Wild roster. Yurov improved immensely as training camp progressed, looking like a player who was starting to grasp the NHL game and adjusting to the smaller North American ice after transitioning from Russia. He isn’t ready to be a point-producer just yet. Still, Yurov joins the Minnesota Wild as a player with professional habits and an understanding of the diligence required each shift, something that separates him from most 21-year-olds. The Wild were hoping to be able to use him at center, but it looks like he’ll be starting at wing. That’s common for a young player with little experience in North America. Having a little less responsibility will give him a chance to learn how to make an impact at an NHL pace. Some Wild fans may not want to hear this, but at this stage of his career, Yurov reminds me a lot of Marcus Johansson. He’s an efficient transporter of the puck through all three zones and a supremely responsible player who will not cheat for offense. Yurov is effective when driving into the zone down the wall and either swinging the puck around the boards to an incoming teammate or pulling up to allow the play to set up around him. He’s capable of getting separation, not with speed or on straight lines, but in how he creates space for himself to operate with the puck. He scans around him and finds soft spots that he can work into without skating into trouble. I expect Yurov to be a positive possession player by the end of this season. He’s capable of turning in quality, responsible shifts on a regular basis, like the one in the clip below, taken from a preseason game against the Dallas Stars. Yurov is capable of providing about 15 such shifts per game, which will endear him to the coaching staff as the season progresses and land him in the NHL lineup on many nights. One issue to monitor with Yurov will be his confidence with the puck and willingness to take calculated risks. Responsible puck play goes a long way, but he’ll need to be willing to challenge defensemen with net drives and one-on-one moves. His tendency to curl back once and look for support after crossing the offensive blue line is something that opposing teams will eventually identify and try to exploit. Once they begin to anticipate it, they’ll jump on him with pressure and force turnovers. Yurov’s physical play will also be a work in progress. He doesn’t have to throw body checks, but he needs to be stronger on his stick in puck battles and be willing to engage in contact on the wall to establish position in puck battles. When he gets the puck on his stick, he’s excellent at protecting it. However, he needs to win more 50-50 puck battles and be more aggressive on the wall. Consistency will be crucial for Yurov this season, as it is for most rookies. On nights where his game is a little off, it’s important that he still brings a level of intensity that will allow him to compete against the best players in the world. If his intensity level starts to slip, it may be worth having him spend some time in Iowa to help him grow his confidence. I’m guessing that Yurov will spend most of the year in the NHL and get better as the season goes on. He’s a more complete player than Ohgren right now, and while he doesn’t have the same scoring ability, I think the Wild coaching staff will trust him more. Between his first game at the Tom Kurvers Prospect Showcase and the close of training camp, Yurov looked like a player who was finding his legs a bit more each day. His intelligence as a player is evident, and I believe it will outweigh the areas where he has room for improvement. I think a season output of around 8 to 10 goals and 12 to 16 assists, with quality possession numbers and the ability to play some middle six minutes, is within reach. That would be a successful rookie season for the 21-year-old.

The State of Hockey has spent this week in jubilation over Kirill Kaprizov staying with the Minnesota Wild for the next nine years. The last time Wild fans had so much to celebrate from a signing was back in July 2012, when the team inked the infamous Ryan Suter and Zach Parise contracts. Note how they're "infamous" now. On Day 1, those contracts carried a poison pill: Their absurdly long term. By the end of the deal, Suter was 40 and playing a depth role with the St. Louis Blues, Parise was retired from hockey, and both had been bought out for four years. All of this was entirely predictable, even to the parties involved in signing the contract at the time. It was just a problem for a different general manager and a different decade of fans. That's the NHL's version of The Winner's Curse. You're signing on to most free agents with the understanding that you're paying for production in the first few years, and the deal is probably going to look a lot worse in their final years. As Minnesotan philosopher Mitch Hedberg once said, "I'm not gonna stop doing something because of what happens at the end." By the time Kaprizov's contract is over, it'll be the year 2034, and he will have just finished his age-36 season, turning 37 years old. Wild fans have seen old-timers produce, of course. Mats Zuccarello posted 54 points in his age-37 season last year, and Andrew Brunette even had a bit left in the tank at that age. However, we can point to numerous examples of things going wrong long before a player reaches that age. Dany Heatley might be the ultimate example. The Wild traded for the two-time 50-goal scorer before his age-31 season, and he stepped into Minnesota's lineup and immediately scored... 24 goals and 53 points. It got worse from there, dropping to 21 points in just 36 games at 32, then a paltry 12 goals and 21 points in 76 games at 33. When the bottom falls out on players, their production can collapse instantly. Jason Pominville went from 30 goals in his age-31 season to 18, then 11 over the following two years. Thomas Vanek was still productive on the power play during his age-31-and-32 campaigns in St. Paul, but was utterly unplayable in almost every other situation. Wild fans have been burned by long-term (and even not-so-long-term, in the case of Heatley and Vanek) deals to aging stars going sour. Even so, it seems misguided to buy into fears that the Kaprizov deal will fall off so dramatically. Why is that? For one, when you look at most of these players -- Parise, Suter, Vanek, and Pominville -- you'll see that they didn't have nearly as much room to fall as Kaprizov does. Kaprizov stands out as a cut above the rest in terms of sheer production and is among the elite of the elite when it comes to players over the last 20 seasons. Points Per Game, Ages 23-27, Since 2005-06: Connor McDavid, 1.70 Leon Draisaitl, 1.46 Nathan MacKinnon, 1.36 (1.361) Sidney Crosby, 1.36 (1.355) Nikita Kucherov, 1.31 Auston Matthews, 1.27 Mitch Marner, 1.26 David Pastrňák, 1.25 Mikko Rantanen, 1.23 Kirill Kaprizov, 1.21 All due respect to someone like Zach Parise, his output was "only" 0.93 points per game in that age span. When his play started dipping, he went from being a 62-point player (over an 82-game pace) in his first four years in Minnesota to being a 52-point player over his last five. Kaprizov is starting out as a 99-point player. It'd be nice to see how these elite producers aged, but other than Sidney Crosby, none of the top-10 have really entered their mid-30s. Kucherov is the oldest of the remaining nine, and he's just 32 and still putting up MVP-type numbers. The list being dominated so much by younger players reflects a bit of an offensive explosion in recent years. So let's take a look at the top-scoring players of Crosby's generation, and maybe a half-step behind them, looking at this same category from 2000-01 to 2015-16: Points Per Game, Ages 23-27, 2000-01 to 2015-16: Sidney Crosby, 1.36 Joe Thornton, 1.30 Alex Ovechkin, 1.19 (1.194) Evgeni Malkin, 1.19 (1.188) Dany Heatley, 1.18 Marián Gáborík, 1.11 Patrick Kane, 1.06 Jason Spezza, 1.05 (1.054) Vincent Lecavalier, 1.05 (1.052) Henrik Zetterberg, 1.04 Those were, more or less, the equivalents of Kaprizov and his peers from that generation. We know how all of their careers have played out through their age-36 seasons. So now let's look at how those players aged, looking at ages 28 through 32 (correlating to Kaprizov's final year of his deal, plus the first half of his extension), and ages 33 through 36 (correlating to the final half of Kaprizov's extension). We see a few different paths, with Kane and Malkin having little-to-no dropoff, and Heatley and Gaborik falling off by almost a third. On the whole, however, the combined total of these ten players suggests an expected decrease of about 15.6% in points per game. If we apply that to Kaprizov, we can expect his 82-game pace to go from being a 99-point player to falling into the 84-point range. Perhaps not Hart Trophy-worthy, but over a point-per-game. It's also interesting that most players on this list were often healthier in that age bracket than they had been before, though that might be a reflection of a small sample size. As expected, the ages when Kaprizov will be in the back half of his deal are much rougher for these star players. We can see massive drop-offs from four players on the list: Heatley, Gaborík, Spezza, and Lecavalier. Among those four, only Spezza remained in the league by age-36, and Heatley didn't even make it to his age-35 season. Those are the worst-case scenarios, but when you look at the overall picture, the decline isn't quite as stark. The group's overall points per game only drops around 15.5%, nearly identical to the drop between their ages 23-27 production to 28-32. If we want to apply that to Kaprizov's 84-point expectation from ages 28 to 32, that translates to being a 71-point player. You can probably account for the injury risk by assuming Kaprizov only plays 74% of the games (the average of everyone here), except that this really seems to be an all-or-nothing affair. Your body seems to either hold up or not. The only player on this list to play between 55 and 80% of their possible games from ages 33-to-36 is Malkin. It's also worth noting that the players who've aged best throughout this time tend to be the ones with multiple ways of creating offense. You may have already suspected that, seeing as the biggest drops in offense from the prime years to ages 28-to-32 came from Heatley and Gaborík, two elite, but fairly one-dimensional goal-scorers. But look at the 10 most productive players from ages 33-to-36, and that trend becomes even clearer. Points Per Game, Ages 33-to-36, since 2000-01: Daniel Alfredsson, 1.17 Sidney Crosby, 1.16 Martin St. Louis, 1.07 Alex Ovechkin, 1.06 Patrice Bergeron, 0.98 Ray Whitney, 0.95 Mats Zuccarello, 0.94 Patrick Kane, 0.93 Joe Thornton, 0.91 Brad Marchand, 0.90 How many of those players would anyone say were one-dimensional? Ovechkin and his ageless one-timer? Granted, but he's a freak. Thornton with his vision? Maybe, although that feels like selling him short, given his exemplary defensive game. Everyone else on the list had multiple ways to generate offense in their primes (even Whitney and Zuccarello, whose numbers are probably influenced by being in the right place at the right time). Kaprizov is an elite goal scorer, there's no doubt about that. His quick-twitch reflexes might slow down once he gets to his mid-30s, and he might not be a perennial 40-goal player anymore. But Kaprizov also has elite vision and hockey sense, and those don't age nearly as much. In fact, you can argue that they only get better with experience. There is absolutely a risk in signing a player to a $17 million cap hit through their age-36 season. Nobody can deny that. However, there is a significant difference between watching a Hall of Very Good-type player like Parise, or a one-dimensional goal scorer like Heatley age, versus a truly elite, multifaceted offensive creator. If the Wild are going to make that big of a bet with anyone, Kaprizov feels like a very strong choice to bank on.

The Kirill Kaprizov contract is a major news story, which means everybody needs to fire off their takes. On one side, you have normal, level-headed folks ecstatic that the best player in franchise history is locked up for his entire prime. On the other side are the joyless pocket-watchers who can’t believe Kaprizov will make over $150 million to play a game. If you’re quoting Drew Doughty and calling perhaps the best Russian-born player in the world “overpaid,” I can’t help you. Then again, he would know, since Doughty once topped The Athletic’s list of worst contracts in the NHL less than a year after firing that shot. Kaprizov will need to age gracefully or play under a rapidly expanding salary cap to live up to the value of his contract. According to Dom Luszczyszyn’s analytical model, Kaprizov’s annual cap hit is about $2 million per year higher than his on-ice value. However, I can’t make a blog post out of just ripping Drew Doughty and re-posting tweets. So let’s go deeper. What kind of team can the Wild build around Kaprizov, now that the salary cap picture clarifies around the superstar’s mega-deal? First, the good news: Kaprizov’s raise doesn’t kick in until the 2026-27 season. That means that as of this moment, Minnesota is projected to have around $16 million in salary cap space at the trade deadline. That only includes the top 12 forwards, 6 defensemen, and 2 goaltenders, so some of that $16 million will be allocated to press box players or injury call-ups, such as Vinnie Hinistroza or Jack Johnson. However, the Wild should still have enough space at the deadline to bring in a serious addition at the trade deadline, barring another avalanche of injuries like they saw in each of the past two seasons. Concerns that the team is “injury prone” are likely overblown -- while some injuries can be recurrent, many are simply bad luck. To name some of the hottest deadline ideas floated lately, Pittsburgh Penguins center Evgeni Malkin’s cap hit is only $6.1 million. New York Rangers winger Artemi Panarin would cost just under $11.7 million. If the Wild can successfully accrue cap space, the sky is the limit in March 2026. But what about the years that the Wild have to pay out those NHL-record cap hits to Kaprizov? For that, we need to break out the spreadsheets. Salary data courtesy of PuckPedia.com Minnesota has a long to-do list in 2026. Expiring free agents include Vladimir Tarasenko, Mats Zuccarello, Marcus Johansson, Vinnie Hinistroza, Zach Bogosian, Jack Johnson, Filip Gustavsson, and Cal Petersen. David Jiricek is also a pending restricted free agent. Some of those are easy replacements, but the list includes both second-line wingers, the starting goaltender, and probably the opening-night fifth, sixth, and eighth defensemen. For this exercise, assume Gustavsson is extended for just over $7 million per year. That leaves around $15.9 million to find two left wings, a Johansson replacement, and fill out their third defensive pair. It’s almost impossible to project a Jiricek extension, given that his 2025-26 play will have a crucial impact on his contract. However, given how few games he’s played over the past few seasons, an affordable bridge contract seems likely. Copy-pasting the Jamie Drysdale contract with an adjustment for cap inflation, a three-year contract with an average annual value (AAV) of $2.86 million seems appropriate. The most expensive and most important item is replacing Tarasenko and Zuccarello. The team could re-sign them, but it’s unlikely they could keep up second-line play in ‘26-27 at ages 34 and 39, respectively. A free agent replacement is more likely if the team is truly chasing a Stanley Cup. Without knowing which wingers will hit the open market on June 1, 2026, it's difficult to be sure of what term and cap hits would make sense. However, accounting for 4% annual salary cap inflation over the next several seasons, and using The Athletic’s analytical model, we can project some phantom second-liner contracts. An average second-liner would be worth an $8.9 million AAV on a three-year deal, and $9.4 million on a five-year deal. If you talk yourself into a lower-end second-line forward, those numbers turn into $7.7 million and $8.2 million, respectively. If you’re keeping score at home, you’ll notice that we’ve run out of money before we could even afford the second free-agent forward. We still haven’t replaced Bogosian, and we barely have enough cap space for a 13th forward or injury call-ups. That raises several questions about the choices we made earlier. The biggest of these is the Gustavsson extension. Should the Wild let Gustavsson walk, and hope to ride a more affordable tandem of rookie Jesper Wallstedt and an affordable free agent? Before hitting the panic button, however, remember that cap dollars are not the only currency a team has to acquire new talent. In other words, free agency is not the only way to fill roster spots. To replace Tarasenko, Zuccarello, Bogosian, and Johansson, Minnesota has three options. In order from least to most expensive, those options are: Backfill from their prospect pool. For example, promote somebody from Iowa directly to the second line. Promote a prospect and replace their previous role. Example: Liam Ohgren fills Tarasenko’s second-line role, and Minnesota pays a free agent fourth-liner. Extend the player to remain in his current role, or replace him with a free agent. Of course, the cap space ran dry before all the roles were filled, because there is a better plan in place. The Wild front office isn’t praying that $23 million in projected 2026-27 cap space can replace two second-line forwards, a starting goaltender, a fourth liner, and a third-pair defenseman. At least, not without some internal improvements. That’s the answer to the type of team Minnesota can put around Kaprizov. If there is hope, it rides on their prospects. If two of Danila Yurov, Liam Ohgren, Charlie Stramel, Hunter Haight, and Riley Heidt can make a jump into a second-line role, they negate one of those needs. Even if they can step into a third-line role and make one of the Wild veterans expendable, that can open up space elsewhere. On the other hand, however, this team relies on prospects Zeev Buium and David Jiricek to provide at least third-pair quality defense. While they could meet that standard, the third pair in the NHL is more challenging than the first pair in college hockey or the AHL. If either of those defensemen doesn’t develop to replace the declining top-three defensemen, Jared Spurgeon, Jonas Brodin, and Jake Middleton, that also becomes a major liability. On the other hand, if Buium, Jiricek, and Faber hit their ceiling, they could be better than the current core. You get the picture. The Wild’s cap situation isn’t perfect with Kaprizov under contract. Assembling a championship roster won’t be as easy as a few strokes of the pen each offseason. On the other hand, many teams would envy Minnesota’s position. They have few holes on this year’s roster, plenty of cap space to add at the trade deadline, and a superstar under contract. They didn’t need to mortgage their future to do it either -- their prospect pool is reaching maturity, and they still hold first-round picks in each of the next three years. It’s hard to assemble a better championship plan than Minnesota’s current roster. They’ve already succeeded at the hardest part: finding a superstar and keeping him in town. The final phase of the plan hinges on executing prospect development effectively. It’s a frustrating conclusion as a fan, but it’s also exactly what sports are all about. Minnesota has the opportunity to field an exceptional team over the next several years. If they succeed, it won’t be because the guys in suits did everything better than the other teams’ guys in suits. Instead, it will be a reflection of what sports are all about: hours in the gym, a dedication to craft, and the discipline to become the very best hockey player possible. Combine that with the talent that the Wild’s top prospects have shown at the lower levels of hockey, and the roster is in exactly the right place to go all the way.