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It’s a great time of year for hockey fans to look ahead. The Minnesota Wild selected five players in this year’s draft, offering an opportunity to learn more about the newest additions to the organization. The team selected two defensemen and three forwards, and I’ll spend some time examining each one in detail in the coming weeks. Previously, I detailed what Wild fans might expect from Theodor Hallquisth and Justin Kipkie, the two defensemen. Now, it’s on to the forwards, starting with Lirim Amidovski, whom the Wild picked with the second of their three fourth-round selections. Amidovski is a hard-working winger who director of amateur scouting Judd Brackett has described as a “heat-seeking missile.” I spent some time watching film on Amidovski, and here’s what I learned about him as a player. Lirim Amidovski 4th round, pick No. 121 (W) Hometown: Alliston, Ontario 6-foot-1, 181 pounds Shoots: Right 2024-25 statistics: 19 goals, 13 assists in 67 games played for North Bay Battalion (OHL) I had a blast watching Amidovski’s play. He has an extremely high work rate and plays with a dogged determination, never taking a shift off. As a skater, Amidovski possesses a strong stride and the ability to accelerate quickly. When he gets his large frame moving, he can surprise opponents with his speed. Amidovski has a solid center of gravity and doesn’t get clunky with direction changes, unlike many younger players of his size who tend to do so as they build strength. One of the first things I noticed about Amidovski is that he is always ready on faceoffs and at the start of shifts. When the puck is dropped, he erupts, winning seemingly every battle or race to a spot. If he doesn't get there first, he fights like hell to establish space or win the next battle. When Amidovski has the puck, he charges straight ahead and puts defenders on their heels. If a teammate has the puck, Amidovski will go straight to the net more often than not. When the other team has the puck, he backchecks furiously. He pressures the puck with direct attacks whenever he gets the chance, maintaining responsible off-puck positioning. North Bay was not a great team this past season, finishing 15th in a 20-team league while averaging only 2.85 goals per game, the second-lowest mark in the league. Needless to say, the team was short on playmakers. Amidovski isn’t a playmaker either, which is reflected in his lower offensive output. However, as the season went on, he had clearly earned the coaching staff’s trust and found himself playing on a dangerous third line that gave opponents fits on the forecheck and in transition. He also started getting significant power-play time towards the end and was called upon in late-game situations, whether his team was ahead or behind by a goal. In North Bay’s playoff series against a much stronger Brantford team, Amidovski was one of the most noticeable players on the ice for either team. He finished the season third on the team in shots on goal. Amidovski doesn’t possess dynamic puck skills and sometimes struggles with his first touch when receiving passes that are on his backhand or aren’t delivered tape-to-tape. Still, he has decent hands and maneuverability in tight spaces. North Bay players had a lot of freedom on the rush offensively, and Amidovski was not afraid to try to break down defenders with penetration and stickhandling. He was often successful at recognizing opportunities to put defenders on their heels and exploit bad gaps. When Amidovski can get in on their hands, he can maneuver through or around them to get into space and put a shot on. While his shot isn’t overly dangerous, it’s heavy. Amidovski possesses a quick release that allows him to let go from multiple angles, which surprises goaltenders and often leads to rebounds, or occasionally beats them clean. In the offensive zone, Amidovski’s instincts are to go hard to the front of the net when his teammates have the puck. When he is the second or third forward in, he watches the play like a hawk, ready to swoop in at the opportune moment. Amidovski constantly works to establish position for tips or rebounds, and remains at the ready to chase pucks down or hound defenders in the corners. Note the last clip below, where he pounces on a loose puck in the slot and turns to bury a quick shot. Defensively, Amidovski is responsible and doesn't cheat for offense. When he has to collapse down low for coverage, he remains there until he has support before moving back to higher coverage. When the puck is sent to the point or contested on the wall, he pounces to apply pressure and forces opposing players to make quick decisions, often leading to loose pucks or turnovers. He’s also a solid penalty killer who can pressure opponents with his tenacity, and hounds loose pucks with an eye toward counter-attacking. He tallied two short-handed goals and was one of the reasons that North Bay’s penalty kill was sixth best in the OHL. Outlook As a right-handed wing that is comfortable playing on either side, Amidovski’s ceiling is that of an effective bottom-six forward who can be a versatile depth piece on an NHL roster. To get there, he’ll have to play the same hard-working, fast-charging style that he has so far in major junior. His high motor and strong compete level, combined with his speed and ability to pressure opposing players in all three zones, is similar to what Wild fans were used to seeing from Brandon Duhaime. The more I watched Amidovski, the more I was reminded of how Duhaime looked during his time playing college hockey at Providence. He’ll also need to work on his puck skills and puck movement and become more precise with passes and first touches. Since North Bay was lacking in offensive talent, there weren’t many opportunities for Amidovski to engage in playmaking and creativity. The AHL will be a good place for him to work on that as he moves into professional hockey. It will be interesting to see how he meshes with better teammates at higher levels. I also think there’s room for growth in his stride that can help him become a faster skater, even as he adds muscle to his frame. Amidovski’s strong center of gravity will allow him to withstand physical play and push through contact as he advances to higher levels. Amidovski is not a dangerous goal-scoring threat, and it’s unlikely he will become one in professional hockey. However, his style of play is conducive to strong possession numbers and tiring out the opposition with determined shifts, which enables offensive zone starts and advantageous matchups for his top lines. It would not surprise me if coaches try putting him at center at some point. His responsible two-way game and ability to cover a lot of ice may make him a good fit for that position. However, he also possesses a significant amount of utility as a hard-skating winger. Amidovski’s defensively responsible tendencies might be partly due to adhering to a structured system. Still, an 18-year-old forward who rarely deviates from expected positioning is indicative of a mature player who won't need extensive coaching in terms of understanding and sticking to roles and responsibilities. That leads me to believe that he will be an effective penalty killer at the professional level. I would not be surprised if Amidovski joins the wave of Canadian junior players that are moving on to the NCAA after the recent rule changes regarding eligibility for such players. If he doesn’t do so before next season, I could see the Wild signing him after next season and starting him off in Iowa for the 2026-27 season.

In the endless, three-year-long debate about Marco Rossi's value, the biggest argument of his critics is simple: He's another Mikael Granlund. It's not a particularly fair critique for either player. Rossi has been more productive than Granlund at a similar age while sticking at center. Meanwhile, Granlund has played 902 NHL games and has five 60-point seasons under his belt. That's a hell of a player. Still, the parallels between the two players make it easy for Wild fans to put them in the same box. Granlund and Rossi were drafted in the exact same spot (ninth overall), ten years apart. Minnesota drafted both of them as undersized centers with a lot of hype. They each had false starts in the NHL before adjusting and coming into their own with the Wild. Granlund played 461 games with the Wild, racking up 317 points, which still puts him in the top-10 in franchise history. Since leaving Minnesota in the Kevin Fiala trade, Granlund has pivoted back to center, spending stints with the Nashville Predators and San Jose Sharks before catching on with the Dallas Stars for their playoff run. Once in Dallas, he apparently impressed the organization enough that the Stars wanted to keep him around, even though he ultimately signed with the Anaheim Ducks. Granlund signed a three-year, $21 million deal with Anaheim. The $7 million AAV is a match to what Rossi is believed to be asking for in his RFA negotiations with the Wild. So while it's easy to argue otherwise, let's accept the premise: Rossi is the next Mikael Granlund. OK, then. The debate's over. We know how much that's worth, and the price tag is $7 million AAV. A seven-year deal would take Rossi through his age 24 to 30 seasons, using Hockey-Reference's cutoffs. During that same age range, Granlund averaged 18 goals and 57 points per 82 games. If that's Rossi's exact career trajectory, then we should be able to expect him to be around a 60-point center over that time. That was the case for Granlund over his last contract (four years, $5M AAV); he averaged 61 points per 82 games during that time. He got $7 million. The market spoke! Sure, they're different circumstances. Granlund was a UFA, while Rossi's rights are restricted. He can sign with another team, but the Wild have the right of first refusal for the contract and have vowed to match any offer sheet. Teams could get into a bidding war for Granlund's services, while they have to be much more strategic if they wish to pursue Rossi. Still, even so, we have another Granlund contract that helps us spitball his value -- his three-year RFA deal signed in 2017. At age 24, Granlund broke out after a shift from center to wing. He blew past his career highs of 13 goals and 44 points en route to a 26-goal, 69-point season. Again, you can draw the parallels between the two players if you like. Granlund increased his career-high by 25 points in a contract year, while Rossi moved his up by 20 last season. Like Guerin has with Rossi today, Chuck Fletcher seemed to have his doubts about going long-term with Granlund after his breakout season. While Fletcher handed out five- and six-year deals for Nino Niederreiter, Charlie Coyle, and Jonas Brodin, he opted for a shorter-term contract with Granlund, signing a three-year, $5.85 million AAV deal. It was a "prove-it" deal of sorts, giving Granlund the ability to show he could play at a high level before hitting UFA status. It also came in at a hefty rate, accounting for 7.67% of the salary cap when it took effect. A 60-point season from a young player was highly valued then, and it remains highly valued now, even if the player doesn't have a long history of achieving that mark. Applying that same percentage to Rossi's cap hit for the upcoming season gives us something in the $7.3 million range. Again, if Rossi is simply the next Granlund... that's what Granlund was worth at a similar stage in their career and trajectory. The Wild have their line with Rossi, but it doesn't appear to be one that's aligned with the market or reality. The highest reported AAV from Minnesota in a contract offer is $5 million, which matches what Ryan McLeod signed as an RFA this offseason, who put up fewer goals and points than Rossi despite being two years older. Come on. It's obvious where this writer stands RE: Rossi's value. A full-time center with strong two-way numbers and 60 points at 23 is a much better asset than Granlund was at any stage of his career. But fine, if you want to insist that they're the same player -- skilled, undersized forwards whose slighter frame puts a ceiling on them -- then, once again, we know what that's worth today. If Rossi is indeed the next Mikael Granlund, then pay him Granlund money. This shouldn't be that difficult!

The offseason is a strange time for a hockey blog. In less than one week, the draft and free agency created enough news to fill an encyclopedia. Days later, the news cycle dries up and leaves us hyper-focused on Day 2 draft selections and obscure language in the CBA. Most well-adjusted hockey fans (not you, dear reader) can usually unplug from the NHL until at least September. That leaves a unique audience for writers to delve into any topic they choose. To that end, I’ll be going deep on the Marco Rossi contract negotiation. What is an RFA? What is an offer sheet, and why would Rossi’s agent shop for one? Most importantly, which side has the leverage, and how does that affect the Wild’s salary cap? First, let’s look at Rossi’s options. As a Restricted Free Agent (RFA), he can technically sign with any team in the NHL; however, if another team signs Rossi, they must send draft picks to the Minnesota Wild based on amounts outlined in the NHL rules. Rossi’s AAV will likely come in around $7 million, so the only teams eligible to sign him are pictured in the bottom right. That depresses Rossi’s value for two reasons. First, supply and demand. Instead of 32 eligible teams, only 19 teams are eligible to sign Rossi at an AAV between $5 million and $7 million. Second, and more importantly, the draft pick compensation depresses Rossi’s market value. For all other teams, Rossi’s contract value is a basic math problem: the value of his on-ice production, minus the value of those draft picks. NHL teams have two currencies for acquiring players: draft picks and salary cap dollars. If Rossi costs a 1st- and 3rd-round pick, his value for all other teams is reduced. Hence, the lower cap-dollar cost for RFA contracts. According to NHL rules, if Rossi decided to sign with another team at that depressed value, the Wild would only need to match that salary number. Therefore, his total market value for any team is reduced. According to my estimates, league rules will reduce his contract value by about $11 million, about $2.5 million per year on a four-year deal. That $11 million number is fluid because different teams may value draft picks differently. For example, the Los Angeles Kings may consider themselves contenders, which would mean they would likely select later in the draft. Furthermore, the players they take may not reach the NHL by the time LA wants to compete. Still, that $2 million figure is sufficient for an estimate. In most RFA negotiations, that makes it easy for the team with that player’s rights (in this case, the Wild) to re-sign that player at a cheap AAV. In many cases, the player’s agent won’t even seek a competing offer. Instead, they’ll create an estimate of the player’s RFA value, meet with the player’s home club, and get something done. However, Rossi’s deal is different. Several factors are at play here that aren’t directly related to the negotiation. One is Rossi’s size and play style, and another is his demotion to the fourth line during the playoffs. The Athletic’s Michael Russo has reported that Rossi was unhappy with his playoff usage. Russo has also highlighted on his podcast that it created a lack of trust, which may make Rossi wary of a long-term deal in Minnesota. Unrelated to that dynamic, however, is the amount of pressure on Bill Guerin to ice a winner in October. The team has publicly acknowledged that they want to win a championship -- now. While Bill Guerin may debate how much of a role Rossi could play in that goal, everyone knows that a 1st- and 3rd-round pick would do nothing to contribute to that goal. All other options to replace Rossi have been exhausted. Minnesota examined the trade market for Rossi’s rights, striking out on JJ Peterka and any other options. They were unable to sign a top-six center in free agency. Marco Rossi is all that’s left. While league rules may have depressed Rossi’s RFA value, he has some leverage over the Wild. On the other hand, Rossi only has leverage over one team. He can’t use that to leverage a better deal, because that team happens to control his signing rights. That’s likely led to this game of chicken. So far, nobody is diving off the tractor. And why should they? Guerin needs to preserve as much cap space as possible for injury emergencies and future player acquisitions. After heart-related COVID complications, Rossi knows better than most 23-year-olds. That’s why Rossi’s agent is shopping for an offer sheet. Essentially, that offer sheet is the best deal Rossi can find with another team. Guerin will have a week to match that contract, or allow him to sign with that team in exchange for the draft picks attached to whatever AAV Rossi’s agent can bid up. Whether or not Rossi wants to play for the Wild next year has nothing to do with it. It’s the only mechanic left that can force the two sides to come together on a contract. So why all this back and forth? Why don’t RFA agents do this immediately every July 1? There are several reasons that would make home clubs their own RFAs, rather than match an offer sheet, which would theoretically inflate his value to the Wild. For example, if Rossi signs an offer sheet, Minnesota can only match the contract as it is signed with another team; they won’t be able to adjust the contract structure or term to meet their own preferences. Another reason Minnesota should prefer to sign Rossi on their own is that league rules prohibit teams from trading a player on a matched offer sheet until a calendar year after their home club matches the contract. In other words, if the Wild match a Rossi offer sheet on August 1, they can’t trade him until August 1, 2026. Both the contract term and Rossi’s trade eligibility are crucial points in Minnesota’s roster flexibility at the 2025-26 trade deadline and next offseason. Matching an offer sheet takes away that flexibility. That all means that Rossi and Guerin are likely to end up on the same side by the end of this. The only way Rossi could become expendable is if the Wild replace him with Danila Yurov or via trade. That trade can’t happen unless they find a contract together, and Yurov hasn’t played a game on an NHL ice sheet yet. In other words, Guerin needs Rossi on this Wild team. Maybe Guerin hates the idea of Rossi as a top-six center. If he does, it doesn’t matter. There’s no other option on the market. Maybe Rossi’s feelings are irreparably damaged by his demotion to the fourth line. Even if that’s the case, there is one final failsafe: A few million dollars can smooth over a lot of hurt feelings.